This Memorandum is a theoretical analysis of some novel arms control questions that have arisen in the course of research on the RAND project, Alternative Central War Strategies (ACWS). It is part of a larger attempt to identify ways of discriminating between "cooperative" and "uncooperative" opponents, of perceiving common and conflicting interests among enemies. This study examines arms control agreements in which initial strategic postures are asymmetric and information about the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union is ambiguous. The study is complementary to, but independent of, a series of forthcoming ACWS descriptive and comparative works on the long run interaction of the force structures of the United States and the Soviet Union, given different strategic objectives.
The design of the study should be understood clearly. This Memorandum does not show, on balance, that the kinds of arms control agreements under analysis are bad for the United States. It does show that under some conditions some arms control agreements may be highly dangerous.
The conditions and sources of dangers discussed here are, unfortunately, often ignored in both the academic and governmental discussions of arms control. In particular, it should be understood that some conditions and sources of danger can be controlled by the United States, but many cannot. The purpose here is to point out some of the conditions that the United States can and cannot control in a dynamic strategic process.
The analysis is designed to be of use to those in the Air Force who are concerned with force structure and arms control. In addition, the analysis may be of interest to the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmenant Agency, and the State Department.
In particular, if serious negotiations about central war postures emerge after settlement of the Cuban or Berlin crises, the analysis should help in pointing out ambiguities and risks in the content of proposed agreements as well as in the terms of inspection and verification. 
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This study investigates the conditions under which some types of arms control agreements, even when there is adequate inspection and verification, may be used as a tool by the Soviet Union to achieve strategic objectives that are undesirable or dangerous to the United States, given current U.S. strategic superiority and the asymmetries in the force structures of both nations. Sets of objectives and postures are examined in a dynamic context to determine those sets that could produce future arms agreements and the types of agreements that might be produced.
The following model of the world is assumed:
(1) The United States currently has strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.
(2) Soviet weapons systems lag behind those of the United
States in some of the following desirable properties --invulnerability, reliability, controllability, firing time, and performance.
(3) Civil defense activity is currently at moderate levels in both the United States and the Soviet Union.
(4) Soviet military planners can count on more budgeting flexibility than their U.S. counterparts.
(5) The Soviet Union knows more about the U.S. strategic posture than the United States knows about the Soviet posture, and this condition will continue to hold in the future. Consequently, lags exist between Soviet actions and corresponding U.S. reactions.
Given these assumptions, on the basis of arms control negotiations, agreements, and information provided by inspection, it is difficult to distinguish between a case in which the United States seeks stable deterrence and the Soviet Union seeks superiority, and a case in which both sides seek stable deterrence. The information tha+ would be provided to U.S. decision makers, given the model above, is not complete enough or fine enough for U. The Question of National Defense, Vintage Books, New York, 1959, PP. 312-321. But it is also argued recurrently that the purpose of arms control is to achieve stable mutual deterrence. There is some ambiguity in definitions and premises that needs careful analysis.
2 The analytical style of much recent literature was set by T. C. Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960. Great insight into strategic problems can be gained through the use of analogy, but it is important to ask seriously whether the analogies Schelling offers --two Western gunmen, a man and wife, lost, trying to find each other, etc. --really correspond to facets of A the strategic situation and not to take them for granted, for the analogies may condition the analysis.
read to determine Soviet intent and strategy and the evolution of R-391 (YebwuMZ' 1902) . "-3- that are likely to produce future arms agreements and examining the types of agreements that might be produced.
But reasoning from particular strategies to plausible agreements is only part of arms analysis. Reasoning from negotiations and agreements to alternative strategies is also necessary. If it is impossible to distinguish the strategy behind an offer, or if identical offers could serve different strategies, then agreement involves some dangers. When uncertainty or ambiguity exist, arms control negotiations and agreements may be important sources of information about the opponent. Unfortunately negotiations and agreements-can be used to generate ambiguity as well as dispel it. It is important to pay attention to the potential consequences of an arms agreement if there is adherence to the letter, rather than the spirit or intent, of the agreement. Are agreements in an asysmmetric and dynamic context effective constraints on the evolving force structures of two nations even with adequate inspection and verification?
The converse of the constraint problem also exists --evaluating the role of arms control in precluding flexible response, when the United States is confronted with rapidly changing political and military states of the world, or with technological breakthroughs. Intentions and capabilities change over time, and arms agreements may be binding on strategic posture at precisely the wrong time. Yet unilateral U.S. abrogation of an agreement that becomes dangerous could create violent political difficulties at home and abroad.
In the following analysis two cases are considered. In each case both the United States and the Soviet Union have single strategic objectives. Although this procedure avoids the problem of conflicting goals, the analysis is important, because the objectives or goals are often proposed seriously as reasonable in the real world. In Case I, the U.S. objective is stable mutual deterrence with some "insurance" in case deterrence fails.
The Soviet objective in Case I is Stable mutual deterrence is said to exist when both the United States and Soviet Union continue to prefer striking second to striking IL strategic superiority at the end of a certain time period, but given the initial asyrmetries, the Soviet attempt to gain superiority must be made in such a way that U.S. suspicions will not be aroused. A corollary objective for the Soviet Union is to convince the United States that it is also interested in stable mutual deterrence.
In
Case II, we assume that both the United States and the Soviet Union are interested in stable mutual deterrence at every point during the time period under consideration.
It should be not ed -_ha±•given the objectives, we are confronted with analytical requirements that differ from the usual calculations 1 of deterrence at a point in time.
At any given time the Soviet Union may be deterred from a first strike, and relevant calculations and intelligence nay indicate this. But, at the same time, the Soviet Union may be making research and procurement decisions intended to decrease deterrence at some future time.
If the United States is interested in stable deterrence, it is imperative that matching decisions be made, given the technological, political, and economic bounds on both sides.
2
The following specific questions will now be examined: 2 For example, having some standby capacity in intercontinental missile production may be as important as having an invulnerable retaliatory capability. In other words, with the objective of stable deterrence, it mny be necessary to hedge by using a modern mobilization base strategy where mobilization is a move precedent to or, in response to a "peacetime attack on deterrence" rather than an initiation of war. (4) What risks does the United States take if tacit or explicit constraints are placed on its force structure?
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These questions are interrelated, and they will be treated simultaneously in the subsequent analysis. In Section II, a series of specific military, political, and economic assumptions are made about the United States and the Soviet Union and about the relations between the two countries. Section III presents an analysis of some arms control agreements in a dynamic context and the answers to the questions above. Section IV contains a discussion of results.
II. STRATEGIC CONTEXT
In exploring the relation between stable deterrence, force structure, and arms control, a simplified strategic'\ model for the United States and the Soviet Union will be used. WhIle models alone are not a sufficient basis for policy, no policy can have a sound basis without some logical analysis of implementations.
For theoretical purposes, it is neither necessary nor desirable to specify all real world relations between the two countries.
Only certain structural characteristics need be specified. But the strategic context and technological structure actually used has to be explicit in order to avoid vague speculations. The aspects of the strategic context considered here are current U.S. strategic superiority, the technology of both sides, civil defense programs, budget constraints, and information flows.
A. SUPERIORITY AND PARITY First, the United States is strategically superior to the Soviet 1 Union and will allegedly remain so for some time in the future. Superiority, like most strategic terms, is imprecise because it is related to intentions as well as capability. The term will be used The reason for considering civil defense here is that it is a necessary condition for a damage-limiting capability, and we are interested in examining civil defense ambiguities arising from the strategic and technological asymmetries.
D. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
It is also necessary to make an assumption about budget constraints for the research-procurement period. The U.S. economy is larger than that of the Soviet Union in terms of initial real GNP.' However, the U.S. econonm is growing slowly and its people enjoy an extremely high standard of living. The United States often has... great difficulty in increasing allocations to the public sector of the economy.
While there seems to be no current difficulty in malking marginal increments to the defense sector, this does not imply that political and economic difficulties would be absent as defense budgets increase.
For these reasons it will be assumed that Soviet military planners can count on more budgeting flexibility than their U.S. 
E. IFOMRMATION FLOWS
The final assumption made in this section is that the Soviet
Union knows more about the United States than the United States knows about the Soviet Union. In particular, the United States will have less information about the relation of Soviet Union defense expenditures to GP, research and development activity, and capacity in specific weapons systems than will the Soviet Union about the United
States. The United States lack of information will give the Soviet Union opportunities for deception, but subsequent analysis will show that even where the United States has good information about Soviet Union activities, the Soviet Union's strategic objectives will remain ambiguous, for distinguishing Cases I and II presents difficult problems of interpretation.
In either case, a large R&D progrm could be interpreted as an atteeat by the Soviet Union to diversitfy its retaliatory capability. The perceived need for hedging agoainst future uncertainties coupled with the unspecialized character of strategic weapons y drawn out potential signals from RD activity.
For each set of U.S. observations, the United States must choose an available strategy, that is, a way to react to any possible data. But often observations will be ambiguous even with an ,d ,nce4, and extensive intelligence effort.
Informtion about present postures and development and procurement decisions must be analyzed in order to make inferences about future strategies and capabilities.
Given Soviet numerical and technological inferiority, interpreting intelligence data will be very difficult. Depending on the nature of U.S. intelligence operations and Soviet counterintelligence activities, intelligence could provide so much irrelevant information or "noise" that genuine signals of intention would be drowned out. deterrence. In Case II, the Soviet Union might be willing to engage in agreements because some of the existing weapons are also superfluous or will become so, and because agreement shows good faith.
While the Soviet Union in II might insist on very large reductions in U.S. strategic forces as compared to I, the resulting debate on this point could assume Talzmuic proportions.
Agreements. on Procurement
A distinction must be made between additional procurement of existing weapons systems and procurement of new weapons where research and development has been completed, and substantial new capacity exists. Agreements about the former have the same ambiguities as the force reduction agreements discussed above. The future Soviet Union posture is not constrained by such agreements. Considering the agreements about the latter, agreements not to procure new weapons systems and to dismantle capacity involve new ambiguities.
Because such agreements may be painful to the Soviet Union, particularly where Soviet economic capacity is less than that of the United States, the Soviet Union demonstrates its good faith. Could the capacity possibly contribute to future Soviet Union superiority? And if it is decided that a weapons system may contribute to the Soviet Union's future superiority, and production capacity is destroyed, what is the technological and economic flexibility of capacity in different, perhaps unrelated, systems in producing a proscribed system?
Civil Defense Limitations
The agreements discussed above are not really designed substantively to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving strategic superiority. If that is Soviet intent, inspections and verifications of the most rigorous kind will not produce stable deterrence.
Unfortunately, category (3), agreements about civil defense, while operating in time, do not help in reducing ambiguity either....
Initially, as assumed above, the United States is superior to the Soviet Union without a large civil defense program, but the Soviet Union will require an extensive program in Case I, since the United States at the end of the Soviet research-procurement period should not have a first-strike capability, but will retain some punitive capability which would have to be blunted. But there are good reasons why an extensive civil defense program would be rational in Case II ---e.g., "insurance" against inadvertent or accidental war and fear of a U.S. first strike designed for maximum counterforce efficiency. Given initial U.S. superiority, even a massive civil defense program by the Soviet Union could be construed as defensive in intent. It is true that a Soviet fallout and/or blast shelter program is the kind of system taken in isolation that protects the population in the event that the United States strikes, avoiding cities. But the combination of a civil defense program plus a system of efficient active defenses could perhaps reduce potential punitive damage from a U.S. second strike to an "acceptable" level, although the U.S. damage potential would still be very great. In interpreting Soviet actions then, the United States finds itself in a dilemma. Depending on the lead times involved, civil defense activity by the Soviet Union is consistent with either Case I or II. But lack of civil defense activity may also be consistent with both cases. If the ambiguities had not been perceived by the United States, it could find itself vulnerable to a first strike such that its retaliatory capability could be reduced and where adverse asymmetries would appear in the intra-war residual damage potential of both sides. And this could imply a consequent reduction in the ability to carry on prewar, intra-war bargaining and negotiations. But recognizing the ambiguities will not resolve them. Even argue that deterrence may be enhanced when there is no civil defense program. An opponent may be deterred from counterforce operations because it is impossible to distinguish between counterforce and countervalue. The population in effect becomes hostage for the safety of a nation's weapons system. Contrary to the Schelling argument, an opponent my attack the weapons if he has a choice. In particular, where one side has superiority and the other side offers a choice, the superior side may simply take it, provided that whatever retaliatory capability remains in the attacked nation will not automatically be targeted against cities, but used to obtain a reasonable truce or war termination. in Case 1, and an enforceable agreement would prevent the necessary condition from realization, if the lead time was long. On the other hand, if large quantities of civil defense can be acquired in a very short period, it would be rational for the Soviet Union in Case I to sign a civil defense agreement providing for inspection and verification, to adhere to the agreement through a large portion of the research-procurement period, and then to abrogate the agreement when its strategic forces were finally ready. Consequently, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish Case I from Case II on the basis of an agreement or the information provided by inspection.
Limitation on R&D
There is one final problem that must be investigated under ambiguity and asymmetry --technological surprise. The technological surprise problem the United States faces is different under asymmetric postures from the one ordinarily discussed where two parties in a state of stable mutual deterrence attempt to remain that way under a rapidly changing technoloy. 1 It was noted above that the Soviet Union must carry out research and development in both Case I and Case II. Distinguishing a priori between weapons systems leading to Case I or Case II may be difficult. For example, an agreement not to promote research on boosters carrying large yield warheads, but permitting research on small boosters, assuming external economies in the production of knowledge, would not prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring some of the information necessary to build large ones, while it seems relatively easy to build clandestine .production lines and to use a space program for testing. However, given an agreement, the United States may not take measures making some of its forces invulnerable to large yield weapons, because doing so, the United States my believe, would generate suspicion about announced objectives, and also might be very expensive. To take another example, 1Fiach, op. cit., pp. 14i-147 discusses technological breakthroughs involving counterforce offensive capabilities, active and passive defense, and countervalue capabilities when stable deterrence exists and the technologies of two opposing sides are roughly comparable.
banning research on all AICBM systems may not be reasonable, since an efficient system deployed at the missile fields increases the invulnerability of a nation's retaliatory capability. Yet there may be an external effect in that there are better city defenses, resulting in a diminished U.S. damage potential after a Soviet first strike.
The examples above illustrate that designing unambiguous agreements on research and development activities that are effective constraints is difficult. The difficulty is compounded by the structural asymmetries.
The 
IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The characteristic feature of the analysis has been the high degree of ambiguity characterizing signals about intentions and capability generated by two nations transforming their strategic postures. Ambiguity has its costs, and some specific types of arms control agreements were considered in narrowing the range of alternative postures open to both sides. In a dynamic strategic process, very few of the arms control measures considered appear to be effective constraints on Soviet behavior.
The following model of the world was assumed:
States in some of the following desirable properties: invulnerability, reliability, controllability, firing time, and performance.
(3) Civil defense activity is currently at moderate levels in both the United States and the Soviet Union. (1) It is extremely difficult to distinguish between Case I in which the United States pursues stable deterrence and the Soviet Union pursues superiority, and Case II in which both sides seek stable deterrence.
The information that would be provided to the United States, given the model, is not couplete or fine enough for U.S. decision makers to discriminate between the two cases.
(2) It is rational for the Soviet Union in Case I to engage in arms control agreements of the kind discussed above, if some of the existing Soviet force becomes superfluous as new weapons are phased in. If this holds, then there are large payoffs to the Soviet Union in Case I in using agreements about whatever weapons are superfluous as bargaining counters and as devices to lull U.S. suspicions.
(3) Negotiations and consequent agreements of the type discussed here might not differ appreciably between Cases I and II.
(4) If tacit or explicit agreements of the type discussed here are placed on the force structures of both sides, the United States might find itself vulnerable to a first strike resulting in adverse asymmetries in its intra-war damege potential. This would imply a corresponding reduction in the ability of the United States to carry on prewar and intra-war bargaining.
These conclusions do not imply that all arms control agreements are infeasible or undesirable, given the objective of stable mutual deterrence. They do imply that care must be taken in designing agreements so that they are effective constraints. This will involve very detailed analysis of the opponent's economic and technological *flexibility. It will also involve designing negotiations and agreements that extract large amounts of information despite the Soviet Union's best efforts at increasing ambiguity, uncertainty, and noise. During negotiations it may be as important to propose a series of agreements believed to be unacceptable to the other side as to obtain actual agreements. A well-designed series of unacceptable proposals may provide vital information, because of the pattern of rejections and because of the overt interactions between two oppone4ts. Any actual agreements should be designed functionally to narrow the number of strategies the Soviet Union can employ while the agreement is in force and to signal that it is indeed violating the agreement or adopting a strategy undesirable to the United States.
Conversely, a nation genuinely interested in stable mutual deterrence must retain some degree of flexibility In its ovn posture.
